The paper examines elite European discourses during Greek financial crisis from its prehistory in September 2008 up to the arrival of the SYRIZA government in January 2015. By reference to the conceptual literature on Discursive Institutionalism (DI) and having coded over 1,000 unique quotes (drawn from a dataset of over 15,000 news wires from Reuters), we argue that the communicative discourse of 63 senior European (and IMF) officials on the Greek crisis during that period have demonstrated significant volatility. To this end we identify four distinct narrative frames (denial, exceptionalism, blame and reluctant redemption), punctuated by three discursive junctures (in 2010, 2011 and 2012), reflecting major changes both within Greece's domestic political scene and in the wider landscape of the crisis that soon acquired more a systemic character. Although we do not equate these narrative frames (either in terms of content or timing) to the actual EU strategy during the crisis (which involved a wider set of parameters), we argue that an empirically and methodologically robust examination of the way in which the Greek crisis was communicated by its main protagonists forms an important part of our understanding of 'bailout politics' in the Eurozone over the past six years.
Introduction
There is no shortage of literature discussing the Eurozone crisis and the deficiencies of the EU's economic architecture in recent years (see, for example, Dinan 2012; Bulmer and Paterson 2013; Dyson 2013; Panizza and Phillip 2013; Pisani-Ferry 2014) . The role of ideas and discourse in the managing of the crisis have also attracted scholarly attention, albeit with variable degree of empirical depth (see Schmidt 2013 Schmidt , 2014 Ntampoudi 2014; Vasilopoulou, Halikiopoulou and Exadaktylos 2014) . This article builds on this literature by focusing on the evolution of European discourses on the 'rescue' of Greece. We focus our analysis on discourses by senior officials, involved in the design and implementation of Greece's bailout programmes rather than the wider public debate on the fate of Greece which also included the media and other more specialised epistemic communities. The timeframe of our analysis stretches from the 'pre-history' of the Greek crisis (the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008) to the arrival of the SYRIZA government in January 2015.
By reference to the conceptual literature on Discursive Institutionalism (DI), and using an extensive dataset of quotes from Reuters, we argue that elite narratives on the Greek crisis during that period have demonstrated significant volatility. To this end we identify four distinct narrative frames, punctuated by three critical junctures (in 2010, 2011 and 2012) , reflecting major changes both within Greece's domestic political scene and in the wider landscape of the crisis that soon acquired more a systemic character. We do not equate these narrative frames (either in terms of content or timing) to the actual EU strategy during the crisis. The latter was shaped by a wider set of parameters not all of which fall under the scope of this article. The examination of elite discourses, however, provides useful insights into the underlying logic that conditioned the creditors' response towards Athens, both in terms of their aggregate evolution (reflecting a degree of policy learning) and their internal diversity (reflecting inter-institutional and intergovernmental conflict over policy).
I. The Greek Crisis through a Discursive Institutionalist Perspective
The role of ideas in political science has attracted a huge body of literature, encompassing many different theoretical perspectives and methodological traditions within the discipline (see, for example, Gramsci 1971; Jobert l989; Bourdieu 1990; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993; Jabko 2006) . More recently, the literature on Discursive Institutionalism (Campbell and Pedersen 2001; Schmidt 2008 Schmidt , 2010 Schmidt , 2014 has sought to recast our understanding of narrative frames and link them (in the form of a new variant) to existing scholarship on New Institutionalism (NI) (for a review see Hall and Taylor, 1996, March and Olsen, 2005) . Building on Foucault (1971) and Connolly (1983) , Schmidt posits that 'discourse' allows for a broader understanding of the role of ideas by encompassing not only their content, but also the processes by which they are conveyed and exchanged (2008: 3).
To account for this dialectic relationship, Schmidt distinguishes between coordinative and communicative discourse. The former involves the interaction between epistemic communities (Haas 1992 ) "at the center of policy construction who are involved in the creation, elaboration, and justification of policy and programmatic ideas (2008: 310).
Communicative discourse, on the other hand, is primarily conducted in the realm of politics whereby political actors seek to legitimise policy preferences and 'sell' them to the public/electorate (2009: 310) . The pattern of interaction between the two types of discourse varies according to circumstance: it can be sequential (with coordinative discourses preceding communicative ones), cyclical (involving a 'feedback loop' between the two) or, indeed, disjointed, whereby the two are not 'in synch' due to the highly technical or controversial nature of the policy involved. In all cases the role of political leadership in the interweaving coordinative and communicative discourses is paramount. It is this mediation that produces the 'master discourse'; the "vision of where the polity is, where it is going, and where it ought to go" (Schmidt 2008: 311) .
Critical in the way in which Schmidt has sought to position Discursive Institutionalism as a distinct variant of New Institutionalism is her approach to institutional change and the role of ideas within this process. Unlike Historical Institutionalism (HI) and Sociological Institutionalism (SI) her approach is agency driven (focusing on 'sentient' agents), whereas (unlike Rationalist Institutionalism, RI, and HI) 'institutions' are defined as "internal [to actors] ideational constructs and structures" (Schmidt 2010: 16) . To this direction institutional change is explained by reference to political actors' 'foreground discursive abilities' to communicate critically about their institutions and ultimately steer them towards change (Schmidt 2008 (Schmidt , 2010 .
The interaction between discourse and institutions, however, can also be articulated 'in the reverse' focusing on how institutional affiliations can affect processes of discursive continuity and change over time. The literature on HI has emphasised the importance of 'critical junctures' as moments where path-dependencies or established equilibria are disrupted, giving rise to institutional reconfiguration or the recalibration of interests and social norms (Krasner 1988; Berins-Collier and Collier, 1991, Pierson, 2000; Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007) . Concepts such as 'critical junctures' (or paradigm shifts) within the NI tradition are not without their critics, not least because of the difficulty in substantiating it them empirically, but also clarifying the underlying causalities behind their emergence (see, for example, Thelen and Steinmo 1992 and Schmidt 2010) .
This article focuses primarily on the communicative discourse of European elites towards the Greek crisis. That is to say we do not delve into the coordinative discourse contained in (confidential or otherwise) communications between the protagonists of the crisis in order to determine policy. Although we recognise the apparent inter-connection between communicative discourse and chosen policy (as well as strategy), for the purposes of this article, we remain 'agnostic' as to the causal mechanisms between them. Hence, we urge caution against equating discursive and policy junctures or assuming that the two take place simultaneously or that they are premised on the exact same foundations. Often discursive shifts can occur either prior or after major rethinks of policy and/or strategy. In the context of the Greek bailout, policy change also involved delicate inter-institutional and intergovernmental negotiations which, in analytical terms, complicate causalities further.
Instead, we see value in trying to substantiate theoretically-informed claims on the continuity and change of the discursive handling of the Greek crisis through an appropriate methodology that involves a large data set (see next section). In doing so we trace the contours of European elite narratives towards the Greek crisis by highlighting the 'discursive junctures' that (re) shaped them during the period between 2008 and 2015. More specifically, we identify four distinct discursive frames ranging, sequentially, from 'denial', 'Greek exceptionalism', 'blame' and 'reluctant redemption'. We unpack the content of these frames both by reference to aggregate data and illustrative quotes by senior officials. We also provide a set of quantitative and qualitative criteria behind the identification of 'discursive junctions', linking them both to pivotal developments in Greece's domestic scene (which European leaders had to respond to) and to wider processes of lesson drawing and policy learning accumulated over time as the crisis engulfed a number of EZ members.
II. Methodology and data collection
Using the electronic depository of news wires by Reuters we trace the communicative discourse of elite European policy makers on the Greek economic crisis from the collapse of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008 up to the election of the SYRIZA government in Greece on 25 January 2015. We have identified a total of 24 post-holders (involving 63 individuals) who have featured heavily in the coordinative discourse of the Greek crisis (see Table 1 ). These include the Heads of Government and Finance Ministers of a representative sample of 9 EZ countries, involving both creditors (Germany, France, Netherlands, Finland, Austria) and bailout recipients (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland) 1 as well as the leaders of key institutions with a big stake in the crisis such as the Director of the IMF; the Presidents of the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the Eurogroup; and the European Commissioner for Financial Affairs. Using searches that contained the terms "Greek", "crisis", "said" and the surnames of the individuals identified above we have recovered a total of 15,388 articles. From this sample we have isolated 1,096 unique quotes which form the dataset for our analysis (see Table 2 and Figure 1 ).
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Each quote is attributed a value in a continuous scale between -2 and 2. The value -2 denominates support for Greece's exit from the Eurozone. Quotes falling under this classification may make references to Greece's "cheating" and the necessary "punishment" that the EU's response should entail. References to Greece's being a "bottomless pit" or of Greece's Eurozone membership being a "mistake" also denominates strongly negative attitudes. Typically for quotes falling under this category, Greece's financial problems are attributed to domestic factors, most notably corruption, clientelism and the incompetence of the country's political elites.
The value -1 denominates support for 'hard conditionality' in exchange of financial support. Many of the quotes under this category are underpinned by the 'moral hazard' thesis and the need for a robust "programme" for Greece under the surveillance of the IMF. Unlike the previous category, the threat of Grexit is never explicitly mentioned, but it is implied only if Greece defaults on its commitments to the creditors. The assessment of the reform efforts 1 The precise mechanisms and extend of such bailouts varies from country to country.
2 When the exact same quote has been used in more than one Reuters news wires, only one entry was recorded (when first appeared). When the same news wire contains more than one quote, these are recorded as separate entries.
of the government in Athens is typically negative and Greece's troubles are rarely placed in the context of wider dysfunctionalities within the Eurozone.
The value 0 denominates neutrality and/or neglect whereby no explicit promises or threats against Greece are made. In the early stages of the crisis, quotes under this category typically fail to acknowledge that Greece (or indeed the Eurozone) was facing a crisis.
Subsequently, neutral statements may defer opinion to the future; for example, after a forthcoming assessment of the programme or a relevant EU meeting. Statements of neutrality may also be connected with forthcoming elections in Greece, with European elites choosing not to interfere with the domestic party political competition.
The value +1 denominates a preference for soft conditionality. Here the typical quote acknowledges Greece's irreversible membership of the Eurozone, but at the same time presses the government in Athens to stick to its side of the bargain. Under this category statements tend to emphasise the dangers of contagion from a possible Grexit and point to the deficiencies of the Eurozone's economic governance. On the other hand the assessment of domestic reform is typically portrayed as "positive" or "encouraging".
The value +2 denominates strong support for Greece's membership of the Eurozone. The potential of 'Grexit' is seen as "inconceivable" and much of the blame for Greece's predicament is placed on the design of the bailout programme itself, rather than its domestic implementation. The underpinning principle of 'solidarity' takes precedence over conditionality or the 'moral hazard' thesis. Quotes falling under this category also mobilise historical or purely political arguments, not least the need to protect Greece's democracy and halt the rise of Golden Dawn.
Although we are confident that there is sufficient distinctiveness between the different values in our scale, we acknowledge that coding of each individual quote is not fool proof.
Sometimes the available quotes mobilise a mix of rewards and threats that cut across the typology we have devised. Hence, the selection of a single value contains an inevitable element of discretion on our behalf. We are also constrained by the fact that Reuters typically publishes only a small extract from longer speeches or statements made by the officials in question. This editorial decision in itself 'contaminates' our sample and can skew the message intended by the official who delivered it. In this respect the context, timing and the target audience of each individual statement also form important contextual information that help nuance any given discourse analysis. Yet, given the size of our sample, access to full transcripts (and other contextual information) would not have been possible. We argue that what has been lost in terms of narrative richness in our data collection strategy, is counterbalanced by the comprehensive coverage offered by the Reuters database.
For the identification of discursive junctures we have used, cumulatively, three criteria:
(i) a significant increase/decrease in the number of statements made by European elites, denominating shifts in the level of international interest on Greece (see Figure 7) ; (ii) significant changes in the average opinion scores by European elites using our coding scale (see Figures 2 and 6 ) ; and (iii) major policy incidents, either within Greece or internationally, acting as windows of opportunity (or 'critical moments' according to Bulmer and Burch 1998) for the recasting of the communicative discourse on the Greek crisis. We acknowledge that in practice these discursive shifts can never be 'cleanly' separated as they form part of the constant process of (re)evaluating the complexities of the crisis. Neither does the timing and content of policy change neatly map onto shifts in elite discourses. Yet, by applying these three criteria cumulatively, we maintain that it is possible to define discursively distinctive phases of the Greek crisis, thus allowing for a more nuanced analysis of the factors that shaped the rhetoric of European elites during the timeframe of our examination. This relative neglect in the coverage of the pre-history of the Greek crisis should be understood in the context of a wider European discourse of denial about the intensity and reach of the gathering financial meltdown which was seen as very much seen 'an American problem' (Fuchs and Graaf 2010: 14) . By the autumn of 2008, the collapse of Lehman Brothers sent shockwaves across the financial world (cf. Eichengreen et. al 2012), prompting EU leaders to seek a more coordinated approach to the deepening crisis. The extraordinary EU Summit held in November 2008 under the French Presidency was the first attempt in this direction. If the Summit itself was recognition of the severity of the situation, however, its rather poor results reflected the EU's inability to construct a convincing discourse on either coordinative or communicative grounds (EUobserver 3.11.08). President Sarkozy's plea prior to the Summit that "Europe had to speak with one voice" was a long way from been realised (Euractiv 27.10.08).
During that time EU policy makers produced a cacophony of ideas over the nature of the problem, its possible remedy and the best equipped institution to administer it. Voices urging the EU to adopt a US-style fiscal stimulus package faced an outright rejection by the German administration, forcing senior EU officials, including Juncker, Barroso and Almunia to dismiss the idea (Euractiv 18.9.08; Reuters 2.10.08,).
In the meantime, the growing concern about Greece's deteriorating economic situation were brushed away by the Centre Right government in Athens as "malicious rumours" budgetary crisis] is a problem that has to be solved at home. It is your own responsibility" (The Guardian, 28.1.10).
In truth, however, Greece's debt crisis had already become too large for the government in Athens and the EU's 'no bailout' discourse had run aground. The announcement of the revised budgetary figures for Greece and the country's effective cutting off from the financial markets in early 2010 made the elaboration of an EU-sponsored rescue plan an inevitability.
In the aftermath of the European Council on 11 February 2010 the EU President Herman Van
Rompuy declared that the EU had shown a "clear message of solidarity" towards Greece (Euractiv 12.2.10). Public statements by most European leaders at the time also reflected a willingness to give Papandreou the benefit of the doubt (see Figure 4) . In the months to follow, however, the meaning and limits of this solidarity would come under severe contestation.
IV. Exceptionalism: the discourse of the first Greek bailout (February 2010 -November

2011)
In communicative terms, the departure from the previous EU stance of 'no bailout' was justified on the premise of Greek exceptionalism. In this context, the 'rescue' of Greece was not seen symptomatic of structural weakness in the design of the Eurozone, but rather the outcome of the country's chronic economic mismanagement by a corrupt and untrustworthy political elite (Spiegel International 11.2.10). Greece's economic exceptionalism was manifested in its 'triple deficit' problem: the largest debt to GDP ratio in the Eurozone, compounded by the huge budget and current account deficits. According to the ECB President at the time: "The euro itself, is by the way, a very solid currency. It's clear that Greece is a very special case and the reason we are here" (Reuters 4.5.10). Statements to that effect were made, amongst others, by Jean-Claude Juncker (Reuters 16.2.10) and the IMF Director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn (Reuters 8.3.10).
During the period February 2010 to November 2011 media interest on the Greek crisis skyrocketed. The number of Reuter's wires matching our search criteria increased tenfold (to average score of expressed opinions on Greece (-0.221) is similar to that of the preceding period ('neglect'), but displays significant volatility (see Table 2 and Figure 6 ). This is reflective of the early optimism that the Papandreou government would be able to deliver on his ambitious targets for Greece's deficit reduction, before shifting towards negativity as the progress of domestic reform began to lose momentum.
In the run-up to the signing of the first Greek bailout in May 2010 the elite discourses centre around the need for respecting European rules and the strong conditionality that
Greece's eventual rescue should entail. German narratives in this respect appear dominant.
Chancellor Merkel argued "Greece will not be left on its own but there are rules and these rules must be adhered to" (Reuters 11.2.10). Her Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schaeuble, went a step further: "strict conditions and a prohibitive price tag must be attached so that aid is only drawn in the case of emergencies that present a threat to the financial stability of the whole euro area" (Reuters 12.3.10).
Indeed, calls for strict bailout conditionality and external verification of compliance (in the form of IMF involvement in the Greek programme under the 'Troika') reflected the erosion of trust between the government in Athens and its European partners. The manner in which the Greek economic implosion was revealed (under the 'Greek statistics' fiasco) brought with it a catastrophic collapse of credibility. This not only fuelled negative stereotyping on the 'cheating Greeks' in many European countries (Euractiv 21.5.10; Schmidt 2013), but also shaped the prescribed remedy to the 'Greek problem'. Hence, 'crime and punishment' were the two sides of the same coin that surrounded the exceptionalist discourse of the first Greek bailout.
By mid-2011, as the position of the Papandreou government at home was severely weakened and the crisis began to spread to other peripheral economies in the Eurozone, the sustainability of the Greek programme came under increasing scrutiny (cf. Zartaloudis 2013).
So did the entire stability of the EZ. Following months of acrimonious negotiations between
Greece and its Eurozone partners a deal was reached, in July 2011, for a second bailout worth 100 billion Euros (Euractiv 21.7.11, see also Figure 6 ). Yet, despite some initial optimism, the July agreement was soon discredited for its complexity and for doing little to reassure the markets over the adequacy of the Eurozone's 'firewall' and the long-term sustainability of the
Greek debt.
Divided over what to do next European leaders produced a cacophony of responses which further aggravated market fears over the Euro (see Figure 6 ). In in August 2011
Barroso bashed "the undisciplined communication of EU leaders", whereas the French President, Nicola Sarkozy, pleased with his opposite numbers "to move on from these national quarrels and get back to the sense of our common destiny...It's everyone's duty to do everything needed to safeguard the stability of the euro." (Euractiv 5.8.11; Reuters 16.6.11).
In the run-up to a new EU Summit in October 2011 to revisit the situation in the EZ,
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European discourses on Greece grew increasingly hostile with some (including the Dutch PM and the leader of Germany's junior governing coalition partner, the FPD) openly calling for Greece's ejection from the Eurozone (Reuters 7.9.11; Euractiv 11.9.11). The German Finance
Minister fell short of publicly endorsing these calls, but remained coy: "It would be a bad government if it didn't try to prepare for things you can't even imagine…" (Reuters 12.9.11).
The discursive taboo of a possible 'Grexit' was now beginning to erode. 4 The summit discussed proposals to pledge more funds for the EFSF and agreeing an outline plan for the recapitalisation of European banks. Concerning Greece, an agreement was reached that the country's debt-to-GDP ratio would be reduced to 120% by 2020 (from 160% in 2011), through a voluntary 'haircut' to the value of Greek bonds held by private investors. The formation of a pro-bailout coalition government in Greece following the June 2012 election was a Pyrrhic victory for those, both in Europe and Greece, who had invested in a discursive strategy of 'clear dilemmas' over the country's continuing membership of the Eurozone. In the end, the election produced a clear parliamentary majority supporting Greece's continuing engagement with its creditors. 5 The new Greek Prime Minister, Antonis
Samaras, had travelled a long way since his days as a fierce critic of the bailout programme, to reinvent himself as the 'guarantor' of Greece's "European orientation" (Samaras 2012 ).
For their European counterparts Samaras and his junior coalition partner, Evangelos
Venizelos (leader of PASOK and Deputy PM), epitomised much of what had gone wrong with Greece. Yet, their unlikely coalition partnership offered the prospect of a stable government and a faint hope that the terms of the second bailout would be implemented.
Redemption appeared to be on the cards, but Athens was called to take the first step.
VI. Nowhere Else to Go: the Politics of Reluctant Redemption (November 2012-January
2015)
The arrival of the pro-bailout government in Athens might have ended a summer of high political drama in Athens, but fears over financial 'contagion' across the Eurozone intensified as the economic health of Italy and Spain came under greater scrutiny Reuters (30.11.11).
This uncertainty was compounded by the election, in April 2012, of Socialist Francois
Hollande in France amidst concerns of rising discord within the Franco-German axis (Reuters 7.5.12). Against this background European stakes in Greece's reform commitment increased further. Indeed, the European discourses during the first few months of Samaras' premiership remained rather negative (see Figure 6 ). The German Chancellor's caution over the new government was reflective of this mood: "we will not make premature judgments but will await reliable evidence" (Reuters 24.8.12). we have the capacity to act and we are able to do whatever is necessary for a firm and sustained irreversibility of the euro as a currency of the European Union" (Euractiv 14.12.12).
In the months that followed European discourses on 'Grexit' began to mellow and the average score of opinions on Greece increased substantially (to +0.356 in our scale, see Table   2 and Figures 3-6 ). As Italy and Spain came to dominate the headlines in 2013, media interest in Greece also subsided considerably with the number of Reuters wires (yearly adjusted)
decreasing to a quarter of that of the preceding period (Table 2 As Greece's efforts to return to the financial markets in the summer of 2014 met with only limited success (Reuters 17.10.14), the fate of the coalition government in Athens was sealed. The inevitability of Syriza's victory in the forthcoming election weakened Samaras' currency in Europe and halted his reformist momentum at home. His European 'redemption' was never to fully materialised. Greece's creditors had already started to prepare for 'the day after': the arrival of Alexis Tsipras at the helm.
Conclusion
This article examined the evolving discourse(s) of senior EU and IMF figures on the Greek crisis. By reference to the conceptual literature on Discursive Institutionalism it argued that Greece's financial implosion produced significant shifts in the communicative discourse used by the Eurozone's political elites. Hence, the nature of the 'Greek problem' remained highly volatile and inextricably linked with the strategic contingencies of disciplining Greece's political elites in order to deliver their side of the bargain. Starting from a state of protracted denial (this is not 'our' crisis), European policy makers were forced to confront a problem for which they were scarcely prepared. Even when events on the ground forced EU leaders to intervene in Greece, the legitimising discourse of the 'bailout' revolved around Greece's 'exceptionalism' (both economic and political), rather than been articulated as an attempt to resolve Europe-wide problems of a more structural nature.
When it became apparent that the Greek programme was running into serious difficulties, European discourses on Greece grew more hostile, evoking explicit threats of a possible 'Grexit' if Troika conditionalities were not met. It was only after the implementation of the austerity package of November 2012 that the 'Grexit' discourse began to soften, as EU leaders sought to prop Greece's fragile pro-bailout government and prevent 'contagion' across the Eurozone's periphery. The process of Greece's reluctant redemption, however, was to remain incomplete as Eurozone leaders refused to relax the conditionalities attached to the adjustment programme, in order to rescue the country's pro-bailout political forces. 
